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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an action by Respondent T3 Enterprises, Inc. (“T3”) brought against 
Appellant Safeguard Business Systems, Inc. (“SBS”) for breach of contract, tortious interference, 
conversion, deceptive trade practices, and accounting, which was required to be arbitrated 
pursuant to the parties’ contract. On appeal, SBS challenges an irrational and excessive $4.3 
million arbitration award that resulted from: (i) legal errors by the District Court regarding 
jurisdiction, forum selection, and attorney-client privilege, and (ii) the arbitrators exceeding their 
powers under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (the “FAA”). 
SBS is a Dallas-based company engaged in selling products to small businesses through a 
nationwide network of distributors. T3 is a distributor in Idaho that was required to arbitrate any 
disputes with SBS through a Dallas-administered arbitration under Texas substantive law. Due to 
an erroneous jurisdictional ruling by the District Court, however, T3’s claims were instead 
ordered to be arbitrated in Boise before three attorney-arbitrators who had no prior experience 
with Texas law. That improperly-formed panel proceeded to disregard—and at times outright 
flout—Texas law to award $1.475 million in damages (plus $2.886 million in doubled attorneys’ 
fees and expenses), relying largely on attorney-client privileged information the District Court 
had incorrectly ordered SBS to previously disclose. In addition, the award inconsistently 
provides future damages for 8-12 years as if the contract continued in force while declaring the 
contract “constructively terminated” under non-Texas law to award T3 the entire value of its 
business in a duplicative way. The resulting $4.3 million award thus far exceeds the contractual 
limit of “actual damages for commercial loss,” particularly considering that T3’s business grew 
5-9% each year after the alleged breaches. [See R. 19632.] Such an inexplicable result reflects a 
panel that exceeded its power, committed manifest disregard of Texas law, and acted irrationally. 
This Court, exercising its de novo review, should vacate the award in full. 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On August 26, 2014, T3 filed suit in Ada County district court alleging claims against 
SBS and others for breach of contract, tortious interference, conversion, deceptive trade 
practices, and accounting (the “District Court Action”). [R. 56.] In an amended complaint, a 
separate Safeguard distributor in Idaho—Thurston Enterprises, Inc. (“Thurston”)—joined the 
District Court Action with its own claims against SBS and other defendants. [R. 273.]1
On October 21, 2014, SBS answered and moved to enforce an arbitration clause in T3’s 
contract requiring the claims against SBS to be arbitrated in Dallas through a proceeding 
administered by the American Arbitration Association’s (“AAA”) Dallas office. [R. 755-770, 
7718-19 (¶ 21(B)).] T3 opposed on the basis that the Dallas proceeding it agreed to was 
unconscionable and against Idaho public policy. [R. 771-89.] After briefing, the District Court 
incorrectly determined it had jurisdiction to consider T3’s objections and further erred by 
holding that Texas law would invalidate a Dallas forum, ultimately ordering the arbitration to 
occur in Idaho instead. [R. 987-88, 994.] As a result, in early 2015, T3 initiated an arbitration 
styled as T3 Enterprises, Inc. v. Safeguard Business Systems, Inc., AAA No. 01-15-0002-6860, 
with the AAA’s Denver office (the regional office for Idaho) as administered by Lance Tanaka 
(the “Arbitration”). [R. 7576, 7606, 7661.] Mr. Tanaka then formed a tribunal of three attorney-
arbitrators—Maureen Beyers of Arizona, the Honorable Kenneth Kato (Ret.) of Washington, and 
Van Elmore of Colorado (the “Panel”) [see R. 7576]—who, as reflected in their resumes, had no 
previous experience with Texas law. [See R. 13822-29.] 
Thereafter, the parties agreed that discovery in the District Court Action (as determined 
under ordinary standards of Idaho law) could be used in the Arbitration. [R. 7597-98.] 
1 SBS separately appeals a trial judgment in favor of Thurston (see Docket No. 45092-2017). 
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Accordingly, on March 24, 2016, the District Court issued an order that impacted both the court 
and arbitration proceeding by rejecting SBS’s attorney-client privilege for thirty-five (35) 
internal communications between its General Counsel and employees/agents. [R. 2219-27.] As 
reflected in Issue 2 below, the Panel heavily relied on those documents in issuing its award. 
On July 22, 2016, pre-hearing briefs were submitted in the Arbitration [R. 7814-39, 
7842-71] and then evidentiary hearings were held in Boise in August 2016. [R. 8110 at 1:23-25.] 
At the conclusion of the hearings, the Panel requested limited additional briefing from the parties 
and proposed findings of fact/conclusions of law, which were simultaneously submitted by both 
parties on September 16, 2016. [R. 7949-70, 7972-8022, 8024-40, 8042-8108.]  
Shortly thereafter, on October 5, 2016, the Panel issued an “Interim Award” finding SBS 
liable for breach of contract, tortious interference, and deceptive trade practices [R. 8143 at 
34:12-14], and awarded the same damages for each theory allocated as follows: (i) $321,657.77 
in past lost commissions; (ii) $373,473.76 in speculative future lost commissions for 8-12 years; 
(iii) $212,432.39 in so-called “preferential pricing” damages; and (iv) $566,143.61 for the entire 
value of T3’s distributorship based on a “constructive termination” theory under New Jersey and 
Connecticut statutes. [R. 8135 (¶ 101), 8138 (¶¶ 112, 133).] After the Interim Award was issued, 
SBS immediately raised a question to the Panel regarding how such a constructive termination 
ruling would impact T3’s post-termination contractual obligations (including a non-compete and 
requirement to return SBS’s intellectual property and confidential information). [See R. 8148.] In 
response, T3 asserted it was electing to be fully discharged from the contract and would return 
only certain intellectual property. [See R. 8146-47.] On October 17, 2016, the Panel accepted 
T3’s election in full and issued a “Supplement to Interim Award” [R. 8150-52] that required the 
return of intellectual property as agreed by T3, but otherwise “excused” T3 from having to 
comply with any of its post-termination obligations. [R. 8151-52 (¶¶ 136-138).] In particular, the 
4 
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Panel improperly awarded T3 the customer lists and confidential information that, as plainly 
stated in the contract [see R. 7715 (¶ 13)], belongs to SBS. [See R. 8152 at 3:2-4]. 
On November 28, 2016, the Panel issued a (“Fee Order”) that granted an additional 
$2,449,208.14 in attorneys’ fees (after a 2.0x doubling of the “actual” incurred amount) and 
$437,126.28 in litigation expenses that are not recognized by Texas law. [R. 8263 at 7:4-12.]  
On December 5, 2016, the Panel consolidated all its previous rulings into a Final Award 
of $4,362,041.95 (the “Arbitration Award”) [R. 8266-67], which T3 immediately sought to 
confirm in the District Court Action while shortening the time to brief a motion to vacate based 
on a contention that the Arbitration Award would have res judicata effect in the ongoing trial of 
T3’s separate claims for tortious interference against SBS’s indirect parent company, the Deluxe 
Corporation (“Deluxe”). [See R. 45.] SBS’s motion to vacate the award was thus filed on 
December 9, 2016, [R. 7662-8307] with opposition and reply briefs filed on December 12th and 
19th, respectively. [R. 9059-75.] The District Court later stated it would withhold any ruling until 
after trial (where T3 failed to prove its tort claims against Deluxe [see R. 9135]). The parties thus 
agreed to an oral hearing on the motion to vacate/modify that occurred on February 21, 2017.  
On March 29, 2017, the District Court denied SBS’s motion to vacate and confirmed the 
Arbitration Award in full [R. 12739-53], then issued a final judgment confirming T3’s award on 
May 5, 2017. [R. 12934-37.] SBS filed a notice of appeal on May 5, 2017 as well (which was 




T3 is an Idaho corporation principally owned by Dawn Teply that entered into a 
distribution contract with SBS dated July 28, 2006 (the “Distributor Agreement”). [R. 7703, 
7720.] The contract had an initial five-year term that was never renewed and thus, after 2011, 
expressly existed on a “month-to-month” basis. [R. 7711 (¶ 10(F)).] Indeed, as acknowledged by 
T3 in the arbitration hearings, the contract was terminable at will by either party. [R. 7877-78 at 
1261:18-1262:2.] Under the Distributor Agreement, T3 is entitled to a commission of 30-35% on 
completed sales for the order of products it successfully solicits from customers and also receives 
a benefit of “account protection.” [See R. 8112-13 (¶ 5).] Account protection gives a distributor 
the exclusive right to “commissions” generated on the sale of defined products to customers 
whom the distributor is first to establish a relationship with and maintain as active accounts. [See
R. 8114 (¶ 4).] The right originated in the 1970’s when there was only one billing point for each 
small business customer and one category of traditional paper products (i.e., checks and forms) 
sold, without being updated through the years to address any technological changes or product 
growth in the industry. [See R. 5461-66 (arbitration testimony).]  
The Distributor Agreement further contains key provisions concerning arbitration, choice 
of law, and limitations on remedies, the most relevant of which include: 
 Paragraph 21(B): 
… ALL CONTROVERSIES, DISPUTES OR CLAIMS … ARISING OUT OF 
… (2) THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES HERETO; (3) THE 
VALIDITY OF THIS AGREEMENT OR ANY RELATED AGREEMENT, OR 
ANY PROVISION THEREOF … SHALL BE SUBMITTED FOR 
ARBITRATION TO BE ADMINISTERED BY THE DALLAS, TEXAS OFFICE
2 These “facts” are derived largely from the Panel’s Interim Award. SBS cites them solely for 
purposes of this appeal (and due to the limited review under the FAA) while reserving all rights 
to deny and disprove the Panel’s inaccurate fact findings in any remand or other proceedings.   
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OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ON DEMAND OF 
EITHER PARTY. SUCH ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE 
CONDUCTED IN DALLAS, TEXAS …. [R. 7718-19 (emphasis added).] 
 Paragraph 18: 
… All matters relating to arbitration will be governed by the Federal Arbitration 
Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.). … [T]his Agreement, the distributorship and the 
relationship between you and Safeguard will be governed and construed under 
and in accordance with the laws of Texas ….  [R. 7717 (emphasis added).]  
 Paragraph 17(C): 
THE DAMAGES RECOVERABLE BY EITHER PARTY HERETO FOR ANY 
CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM … SHALL BE LIMITED TO ACTUAL DAMAGES 
FOR COMMERCIAL LOSS. NEITHER PARTY HERETO SHALL BE LIABLE 
TO THE OTHER FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES …. [R. 7717 (emphasis added).]   
In 2013, Safeguard Acquisitions, Inc. (“SAI”)—an affiliate of SBS—purchased Form 
Systems Inc. d/b/a DocuSource (“DocuSource”) and Idaho Business Forms (“IBF”), two larger 
independent distributors in the Pacific Northwest. [R. 8119 (¶ 17), 8121 (¶ 23).] Prior to the 
acquisitions, DocuSource and IBF were well-established multi-million dollar businesses that sold 
products, in part, within some of the same geographic areas of Idaho as T3. [See R. 8119-20 
(¶ 18).] Afterwards, the acquired companies continued selling the same products to their same 
historical accounts, only doing so as SBS-affiliated outlets. [R. 8121 (¶ 26).] Some of those 
sales, however, were to the same general organizations to which T3 was also selling low-volume 
amounts of traditional paper products (i.e., checks, envelopes, forms), but largely involved 
complex unique customized products/services provided to different billing contacts within the 
larger customer organizations. [See, e.g., R. 8127 (¶¶ 58-60).] In many cases, there were pre-
existing contracts between DocuSource/IBF and their larger customers that T3 could not become 
a party to or properly service. 
Once the acquisitions were completed in 2013, SBS’s General Counsel (Michael Dunlap) 
attempted to negotiate with T3 regarding account protection rights related to DocuSource/IBF’s 
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ongoing sales to overlapping organizations. [See R. 8122 (¶ 32).] Summarizing due to the limited 
grounds for review of an arbitration award, the result of the negotiations were that T3 ended up 
selling its account protection rights as to some customers back to SBS while not agreeing to do 
so for others when it decided to file suit in August 2014. [See, e.g., R. 8134 (¶ 95).] Notably, 
there was no evidence in the Arbitration that T3 suffered a loss at any time in regard to its own 
historical commission levels as a result of the acquisitions. To the contrary, T3’s own profits 
indisputably grew after the acquisitions. In 2010, its commissions were $168,786.53 and 
increased each year thereafter as follows: $171,786.53 (+1.78%) in 2011; $181,300.37 (+5.54%) 
in 2012; $191,059.10 (+5.38%) in 2013; $199,458.03 (+4.40%) in 2014; and $219,354 (+9.98%) 
in 2015. [R. 8128-29 (¶ 68).] Further, T3 remained a distributor during the Arbitration hearings 
in August 2016 (as it does to this day) and, again, its commissions had increased by that point to 
more than $220,000 for the year of 2016. [R. 8129 (¶ 68).] As such, what T3 sought to recover 
by its claims was not any actual loss to its own historical business, but the gross profits (not 
“commissions”) on sales by DocuSource/IBF, regardless of whether those unique product or 
service sales were for business T3 never offered or was able to service, or were provided to 
completely different areas of the greater customer organizations at issue under different existing 
contracts and to different billing contacts.   
As set out in the Course of Proceedings, the Panel ultimately awarded $4.3 million to T3 
not only for the alleged actual loss (i.e., the gross profit on sales by DocuSource/IBF) but also 
the entire alleged current market value of T3’s business, plus speculative future losses for “8 to 
12 years,” and doubled attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses in total disregard of Texas law. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court’s decision to strike the Dallas arbitration process was 
an error that requires vacating the award in full. 
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2. Whether the District Court’s overruling of SBS’s claim of attorney-client 
privilege was an error that requires vacating the award in full. 
3. Whether the District Court erred in denying SBS’s motion to vacate the award 
based on the Arbitration Panel exceeding its powers under FAA § 10(a)(4). 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1 raises issues of jurisdiction and arbitrability, which are questions of law over 
which this Court exercises free review. See Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 
Idaho 308, 315, 246 P.3d 961, 968 (2010); see also H.F.L.P., LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 157 
Idaho 672, 678, 339 P.3d 557, 563 (2014). Subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, 
including on appeal, and cannot be waived. See Johnson v. Blaine Cty., 146 Idaho 916, 924, 204 
P.3d 1127, 1135 (2009); Troupis v. Summer, 148 Idaho 77, 79, 218 P.3d 1138, 1140 (2009).  
Rulings on discovery matters—such as attorney-client privilege for Issue 2—are subject 
to a trial court’s sound discretion. See Vaught v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 131 Idaho 357, 360, 956 
P.2d 674, 677 (1998). To determine if there was an abuse of discretion, this Court considers 
whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with legal standards; and (3) reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. See Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51, 
995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000). Evidentiary matters are further subject to the requirement that an error 
must have affected a party’s substantial right. Id. 
Review of the Arbitration Award for purposes of Issue 3 is governed by the FAA, which 
applies to all arbitrations affecting interstate commerce or, pursuant to the parties’ choice of 
Texas law, by their agreement that the FAA would govern arbitration. See Hecla Mining Co. v. 
Bunker Hill Co., 101 Idaho 557, 561, 617 P.2d 861, 865 (1980) (when interstate commerce is 
involved, this Court “utilize[s] the [FAA] and the cases thereunder instead of Idaho’s enactment 
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of the Uniform Arbitration Act.”); In re Kellogg Brown & Root, 80 S.W.3d 611, 617 (Tex. App. 
2002) (“We hold that when, as here, the parties agree to arbitrate under the FAA, they are not 
required to establish that the transaction at issue involves or affects interstate commerce.”). The 
grounds for vacating an award under the FAA include when “the arbitrators exceeded their 
powers,” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), which is interpreted by federal courts to occur when:  
 Arbitrators disregard the parties’ choice of law, see Coutee v. Barington 
Capital Grp., L.P., 336 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Arbitrators act 
beyond their authority if they fail to adhere to a valid, enforceable choice of 
law clause agreed upon by the parties.”); 
 Arbitrators exhibit a “manifest disregard”3 of the controlling law, see Comedy 
Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009), 
including by disregard of undisputed facts, see Coutee, 336 F.3d at 1133 
(courts cannot “confirm an arbitration award that is legally irreconcilable with 
the undisputed facts” and, “because facts and law are often intertwined, an 
arbitrator’s failure to recognize undisputed, legally dispositive facts may 
properly be deemed a manifest disregard for the law”);  
 The award violates an express limitation in the parties’ contract, see Mich. 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1995); 21st 
Century Fin. Servs., LLC v. Manchester Fin. Bank, 747 F.3d 331, 336 (5th 
Cir. 2014) (“Where arbitrators act contrary to express contractual provisions, 
they have exceeded their powers.”);  
 The award contains an inconsistency that renders it “completely irrational,” 
see Comedy Club, Inc., 553 F.3d at 1288 (9th Cir. 2009); or 
3 After the U.S. Supreme Court’s Hall Street decision in 2008, some federal appellate circuits 
questioned whether “manifest disregard” remains valid. The Ninth Circuit and a majority of 
others hold it is still valid because, in essence, manifest disregard was always interpreted as one 
way an arbitrator exceeds their power under FAA § 10(a)(4). See, e.g., Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 
1289-90. A minority of federal circuits no longer use the phrase as a “term of art” because they 
had interpreted manifest disregard to be a “nonstatutory” ground. See, e.g., Citigroup Glob. 
Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009). For this appeal, SBS relies upon the 
statutory-based standards of manifest disregard approved by the majority of federal circuits. 
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 The award grants relief that offends public policy, see Aramark Facility Servs. 
v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 530 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2008) (“However, one 
narrow exception to this generally deferential review is the now-settled rule 
that a court need not, in fact cannot, enforce an award which violates public 
policy.”). 
An appellate court’s review of an arbitration award under the FAA is de novo in all regards. See 
Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007). 
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 40, SBS requests an award of its costs on appeal. SBS does not seek an 
award of attorneys’ fees on appeal because neither the FAA nor Texas law allows fees to be 
recovered for post-arbitration proceedings. [See, e.g., R. 12903-05 (district court rejecting T3’s 
request for attorneys’ fees on same basis and citing authority).]   
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT’S DECISION TO STRIKE THE DALLAS ARBITRATION PROCESS 
WAS AN ERROR THAT REQUIRES VACATING THE AWARD IN FULL. 
The Distribution Agreement between T3 and SBS mandates that any dispute be arbitrated 
in Dallas, Texas, in a proceeding administered by the Dallas office of the AAA. [R. 7718-19 
(¶ 21(B)).] Texas law was chosen to govern all substantive state law matters with the FAA 
governing all arbitration matters. [R. 7717.] Accordingly, shortly after T3 filed suit, SBS moved 
to compel arbitration under the FAA. T3 responded by arguing the Dallas forum was 
unconscionable and against Idaho public policy and, ultimately, that the entire arbitration 
agreement was unenforceable. [See R. 773-82, 963-67.] The District Court denied T3’s request 
to annul the entire arbitration clause, but struck the Dallas forum. [See R. 986-89, 994.]  
The District Court’s ruling was erroneous for two reasons: (i) the District Court did not 
have jurisdiction to address T3’s objection to forum and (ii) there is no support for the legal 
conclusion that a Texas court would invalidate a Dallas forum on the basis of Idaho law when 
11 
47140.0001.10672375.1 
the parties agreed Texas law would govern the contract. The District Court’s error substantially 
prejudiced SBS by eliminating the arbitration process agreed to by the parties in their contract 
(i.e., administration by the Dallas office of the AAA in Dallas), and must be vacated in full. 
A. The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Rule on the Forum, 
Rendering the Entire Arbitration Proceeding in Idaho Invalid. 
After SBS’s motion to compel arbitration was filed in 2014, the District Court 
appropriately questioned, sua sponte, if it had jurisdiction to consider T3’s argument that the 
Dallas forum was unconscionable or against public policy [see R. 978], but then incorrectly 
answered that question. In its order of December 17, 2014, the District Court first noted 
(properly) that FAA § 2 provides an arbitration agreement is enforceable unless subject to being 
revoked under a “generally applicable contract defense” [R. 980], and acknowledged substantial 
federal case law providing that procedural matters such as forum are for an arbitrator to decide. 
[R. 981 (citing cases).] However, the District Court distinguished that federal law on the grounds 
that none involved a challenge to forum by way of a generally applicable contract defense 
[R. 983], ultimately concluding: “where a forum selection clause is challenged pursuant to a 
contract defense, the issue becomes a substantive one for the court to decide rather than a matter 
of procedure for the arbitrator,” and deeming T3’s challenge a substantive one because it 
“place[d] the validity of the entire arbitration clause at issue.” [R. 983-84 (emphasis added).]  
That ruling was incorrect because Section 21(B)(3) of the Distributor Agreement 
provides that disputes concerning the “validity” of the agreement were themselves committed to 
arbitration [see R. 7718 (¶ 21(B)) (“… (3) THE VALIDITY OF THIS AGREEMENT … OR 
ANY PROVISION THEREOF … SHALL BE SUBMITTED FOR ARBITRATION” in 
Dallas)], and T3 did not raise any general contract defense to that specific delegation provision. 
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As such, the District Court had no jurisdiction to order the arbitration occur in Idaho. T3’s 
objection to forum was supposed to be arbitrated in a proceeding administered from Dallas.  
The conclusion that the District Court did not have jurisdiction is mandated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010). In Rent-A-
Center, the plaintiff similarly challenged an agreement to arbitrate on the basis it was 
unconscionable (under Nevada law) and the Ninth Circuit similarly decided, like the District 
Court here, that when “a party challenges an arbitration agreement as unconscionable, and thus 
asserts that he could not meaningfully assent to the agreement, the threshold question of 
unconscionability is for the court.” Id. at 66-67. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, however, 
because the contract contained a provision requiring disputes over the enforceability of the 
agreement to themselves be arbitrated in the first instance. Id. at 72-75 (labeling such a clause a 
“delegation provision”). Further, it mattered none that the delegation provision was part of a 
larger arbitration agreement challenged in whole as unconscionable by the plaintiff, because: 
Section 2 [of the FAA] operates on the specific “written provision” to “settle by 
arbitration a controversy” that the party seeks to enforce. Accordingly, unless 
Jackson challenged the delegation provision specifically, we must treat it as valid 
under § 2, and must enforce it under §§ 3 and 4, leaving any challenge to the 
validity of the [arbitration agreement] as a whole for the arbitrator. 
Id. at 72 (emphasis added, clarification in brackets).4 The same is true here. The delegation 
provision in Paragraph 21(B)(3) was not specifically challenged. [See R. 773-82.]. T3’s objection 
to forum thus also had to be arbitrated in a proceeding administered by the AAA’s Dallas office.  
4 See also Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016); Parnell v. CashCall, 
Inc., 804 F.3d 1142, 1148 (11th Cir. 2015) (language requiring arbitration of “any issue 
concerning the validity, enforceability, or scope” of contract was delegation provision); Danley 
v. Encore Capital Grp., Inc., 680 F. App’x 394, 397 (6th Cir. 2017) (same).  
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Consequently, the District Court’s order to arbitrate in Idaho was invalid due to a lack of 
jurisdiction. See Kantor v. Kantor, 160 Idaho 803, 808, 379 P.3d 1073, 1078 (2016) (“judgments 
and orders made without subject matter jurisdiction are void”). The resulting Arbitration Award 
is void and must be vacated in full. See, e.g., State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 328, 246 P.3d 979, 
981-83 (2011) (vacating civil order issued in criminal case when court did not have jurisdiction);
see also Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Papalote Creek II, LLC, 858 F.3d 916, 927 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(vacating arbitration award when district court did not have jurisdiction).  
B. Alternatively, the District Court Erred as to Texas Law on Forum Selection 
and Thereby Violated Section 5 of the FAA.
Even if the District Court had jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Dallas forum 
selection, it erred as a matter of law on the merits of that legal issue in a way that negated SBS’s 
right to a Dallas-administered arbitration, which is a violation of FAA § 5 requiring vacatur.  
In its December 17, 2014, order addressing the merits of the forum issue, the District 
Court first correctly ruled the parties validly chose Texas law—not Idaho law—to govern their 
dispute and that their choice of law must be enforced. [See R. 984-86 (citing I.C. § 28-1-301(a)).] 
Nevertheless, after concluding Idaho law did not apply, the District Court then went on to rule 
that a Texas court (applying Texas law) would invalidate the Dallas forum based on an Idaho 
statute (I.C. § 29-110(1) (hereinafter, the “Arbitration in Idaho Only Statute” or “AIO Statute”)). 
[See R. 986-89.] That conclusion of law was an error. To illustrate, it is useful to break the 
District Court’s circular analysis into its four component parts, which were:  
1. I.C. § 28-1-301(a) requires enforcing the choice of Texas law. [R. 984-86.]  
2. Texas has adopted M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) 
(hereinafter, “The Bremen”) to assess forum selection clauses. [R. 987.] 
3. The Bremen states that, for a forum selection clause to be valid, it must not 
contravene a strong public policy “either in the forum where the suit would 
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be brought, or the forum from which the suit has been excluded.” [R. 987 
(bolding added to reflect error in District Court’s quotation of law).] 
4. Texas law would apply The Bremen—as misquoted above—to rule the AIO 
Statute (I.C. § 29-110(1)) invalidates a Dallas forum. [R. 987-89.] 
As highlighted in bold above, the District Court made a conspicuous error in its quotation of law. 
The Bremen does not consider the public policy of an “excluded” forum. See 407 U.S. at 15. 
Rather, the “excluded” language incorrectly attributed to The Bremen by the District Court 
comes solely from a Florida appellate court.5 As discussed further below, that inaccuracy led the 
District Court to misapply Texas law on forum selection clauses (i.e., No. 4 above).  
On a more basic level, however, the District Court erred in how it did not give proper 
effect to Idaho’s choice of law statute, I.C. § 28-1-301(a). It appears the District Court was under 
the unwarranted impression that the AIO Statute applies to every arbitration clause considered by 
an Idaho court regardless of an express choice-of-law provision. Nothing in the Idaho Code 
provides for such a broad application. Certainly a contract between two out-of-state parties 
brought to an Idaho court for adjudication (due perhaps to general jurisdiction), would not result 
in application of the AIO Statute to invalidate their agreement to arbitrate elsewhere. To the 
contrary, it would be the substantive law that governs the contract which controls. See, e.g., 
Sizemore v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-00511-MHW, 2012 WL 13041446, at *4 (D. 
5 The District Court’s misquote is derived from its reliance on Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Energywave 
Corp., 116 Idaho 56, 59, 773 P.2d 1143, 1146 (1989), a case involving Florida law, to make an 
improper assumption about Texas law. Cerami-Kote cited a Florida appellate case that, for 
unknown reason, added the “excluded” forum language to its citation of The Bremen. See 
Maritime Ltd. P’ship v. Greenman Advert. Assocs., Inc., 455 So. 2d 1121, 1123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1984). But no “excluded” forum language exists in The Bremen or the Florida Supreme 
Court case that Cerami-Kote actually relied upon. See Cerami-Kote, 116 Idaho at 59 (citing 
Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437, 438 (Fla. 1986)). More importantly, no Texas case has 
expanded on The Bremen like the Florida appellate court did in Maritime. Texas law plainly does 
not consider an “excluded” forum’s policies when assessing a forum selection clause. 
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Idaho May 9, 2012) (finding AIO Statute inapplicable when parties selected Indiana law); see 
also Fisk v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 141 Idaho 290, 108 P.3d 990 (2005) (rejecting AIO 
Statute when federal maritime law governed).6 The same result should occur here due to the 
parties’ choice of Texas law. When another state’s law is selected in compliance with I.C. § 28-
1-301(a), then the rest of Idaho law no longer applies (and, further, subsection (b) of I.C. § 28-1-
301 lists statutes that survive the choice of law, but does not include the AIO Statute). As a 
result, given the parties’ valid choice of Texas law—as the District Court ruled [see R. 984-86] 
and T3 never disputed [see R. 774]—there was no basis for applying the AIO Statute.  
The District Court accordingly erred in concluding Texas law would apply the AIO 
Statute to invalidate a Dallas arbitration forum. As explained in footnote 5 above, the District 
Court erred in relying on Florida law to make its legal conclusion. The Texas cases cited (but not 
applied) by the District Court uniformly are guided by the public policy of Texas when analyzing 
forum selection clauses. [See R. 987-88 (District Court’s order citing In re Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 
257 S.W.3d 228, 231-32 (Tex. 2008); In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 111-13 (Tex. 2004)).] 
And, in Texas, there is no policy limiting where parties can arbitrate. To the contrary, Texas law 
has a very strong preference for enforcing forum selection clauses, even if it may otherwise 
impair substantive rights. See, e.g., In re Lyon, 257 S.W.3d at 234 (holding inability to assert 
usury claim in Pennsylvania did not create public policy basis to deny enforcement of forum 
selection); Young v. Valt.X Holdings, Inc., 336 S.W.3d 258, 263-66 (Tex. App. 2010) (enforcing 
forum selection clause claimed to contradict federal policy of anti-waiver of securities laws, 
6 See also Oregon-Idaho Utils., Inc. v. Skitter Cable TV, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-00228-EJL, 2017 
WL 3446290, at *7 (D. Idaho Aug. 10, 2017) (noting that, if the AIO Statute “was determinative, 
striking down the forum selection clause would be routine rather than extraordinary, standing 
Atlantic Marine on its head.”) (citations omitted). 
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noting plaintiff was free to reject contract on front end if it desired such protections); see also 
Univ. Comput. Consulting Holding, Inc. v. Hillcrest Ford Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., Nos. 14-04-
00819-CV, 14-04-01103-CV, 2005 WL 2149508, at *5 (Tex. App. Sept. 8, 2005) (rejecting The 
Bremen challenge to uphold out-of-state arbitration forum).  
Further, an even more stringent rule of enforcement applies when a party seeks to avoid 
an arbitration forum it agreed to when the FAA governs. See, e.g., Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., 
Inc. v. Ministry of Def. of Republic of Venezuela, 575 F.3d 491, 503 (5th Cir. 2009) (arbitration-
forum clauses “must be enforced, even if unreasonable” under The Bremen, given FAA’s 
preemption of state law) (citations omitted).  
As a result, even if the District Court had jurisdiction to rule on T3’s objections to forum, 
the District Court erred as to its conclusions of Texas law. SBS and T3 specifically agreed, in 
bold all-capital terms, that all disputes would be decided in a Dallas-administered AAA 
arbitration in Dallas. [R. 7718 (¶ 21(B)).] The District Court negated that right by ordering the 
arbitration to occur in Idaho. [See R. 994.] As a jurisdictional matter, the Arbitration Award must 
be vacated because the entire Idaho proceeding was invalid. To the extent the District Court had 
jurisdiction and only erred as to Texas law, the outcome nonetheless is the same under FAA § 5.  
Section 5 of the FAA states that, “[i]f in the [arbitration] agreement provision be made 
for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall
be followed.” (emphasis added). A failure to strictly comply with the process required by a 
contract requires any subsequently-issued award to be vacated. For example, in PoolRe Ins. 
Corp. v. Org. Strategies, Inc., 783 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2015), the Fifth Circuit vacated an award 
where the arbitrator was not selected by the B.W.I. Insurance Director of Anguilla as stated in 
the parties’ contract, even though no such person actually existed. The Fifth Circuit found the 
procedural defect nonetheless fatal, holding that “awards made by arbitrators not appointed 
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under the method provided in the parties’ contract must be vacated.” Id. at 263 (emphasis added). 
Several other federal circuits have held the same way for various procedural defects.7
The only basis not to vacate an award under FAA § 5 is due to a “trivial departure” or 
when a party waives the process required by the contract. Neither is at issue here. Arbitration is a 
matter that arises solely through the consent of the parties. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (reciting principle and precedent). As a result, the failure to 
strictly follow the exact procedure stated in the parties’ contract is always a non-trivial violation. 
A “trivial departure” occurs only in tangential ways outside the contract language itself, such as 
when an arbitration organization selected by the parties fails to follow its internal procedures. 
See, e.g., Bulko v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., 450 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 2006) (failure of NASD 
to follow its own qualification standards trivial; distinguishing from cases where method for 
selecting arbitrators stated in parties’ agreement). Further, a waiver of strict compliance with the 
process stated in an arbitration agreement occurs only when an aggrieved party’s objection is not 
preserved by either: (i) raising it to the arbitrators, or (ii) an adverse court ruling. See Brook v. 
Peak Int’l, Ltd., 294 F.3d 668, 674 (5th Cir. 2002), opinion modified on reh’g (July 9, 2002).  
Here, there was no “trivial departure” because the Distributor Agreement explicitly states 
the arbitration was to be administered by the AAA’s Dallas office and occur in Dallas, but, as a 
result of the District Court’s order, it was administered by the AAA’s Denver office (the regional 
office for Idaho) [see R. 7576, 7606, 7661 (Lance Tanaka in Denver)] and occurred in Boise. 
That failure alone requires vacating the Arbitration Award under FAA § 5. Nonetheless, 
7 See, e.g., Cargill Rice, Inc. v. Empresea Nicaraguense Dealimentos Basicos, 25 F.3d 223, 226 
(4th Cir. 1994) (vacating award when contract required arbitrators appointed by mutual 
agreement and it was done without party input); Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Garage Emps. 
Union, Local 272, 791 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1986) (vacating award when arbitrator was appointed 
pursuant to collective bargaining agreement as opposed to by AAA as required in contract).
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additional prejudice exists in that, if the process stated in the contract had been followed, then the 
claims would have been submitted to the AAA’s Dallas office and there would have been a pool 
of arbitrators experienced with Texas law from which to form a panel. Instead, the AAA’s 
Denver office formed a tribunal of attorneys who had no prior experience with Texas law. [See
R. 13822-29 (arbitrator resumes).] The result, as discussed below in Issue 3, was a Panel that 
manifestly disregarded the controlling Texas law and exceeded its powers to issue an irrational 
$4.3 million award that violated several express contractual limitations and requirements. 
Finally, there is no waiver because, again, the District Court affirmatively ordered the 
arbitration to occur in Idaho. [See R. 994 (stating “T3 shall submit its claims against SBS for 
arbitration in Idaho”).] SBS’s opposition was thus fully preserved for this appeal. 
Accordingly, this Court should declare the Arbitration Award void due to the District 
Court’s lack of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, even if the District Court had jurisdiction, this Court 
should vacate the Arbitration Award because the District Court violated FAA § 5.  
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING SBS’S ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE,
WHICH REQUIRES VACATING THE AWARD IN FULL. 
Several months prior to the August 2016 Arbitration hearings, the District Court 
separately made an incorrect ruling on attorney-client privilege that forced SBS to disclose 
privileged documents which, to its prejudice, were relied on by the Panel for its award. Under 
well-established Idaho law and public policy, that error requires vacating the Arbitration Award. 
This issue has two components: (i) whether the District Court committed legal error in its 
order of March 24, 2016, as to attorney-client privilege [see R. 2219-28], and (ii) how that error 
affected the Arbitration. The first component is exactly the same for SBS’s separate appeal of 
Thurston’s trial judgment. [See R. 13636 (ninth bullet).] Further, given T3 and Thurston jointly 
moved for this discovery matter to be determined by the District Court [see R. 1618-19], this 
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Court’s review now is done under the ordinary standards of Idaho law as opposed to the very 
limited FAA review. Accordingly, the initial argument in subsection A below is identical to that 
in the contemporaneously-filed brief for Thurston’s appeal (see pp. 17-22 of that brief). The 
briefs differ in that subsection B below addresses how the error affected T3’s Arbitration, 
whereas the brief in Thurston’s appeal addresses the impact on the separate trial. 
A. As a Matter of Idaho Law, the District Court Erred in Overruling SBS’s 
Assertion of Attorney-Client Privilege.
In the discovery phase of the District Court proceeding (months prior to the arbitration 
hearings), T3 and Thurston jointly challenged SBS’s assertion of attorney-client privilege over a 
few hundred emails that were redacted or withheld in full. In response, SBS’s trial counsel 
conducted a second-level review of its privilege log and, for various reasons, withdrew privilege 
as to all but forty-one (41) documents, which was about 90% of what was initially logged. [See
R. 1863-67, 10272 (¶ 31) (explaining reasons for de-designation).] That left in dispute internal 
communications to or from Michael Dunlap, SBS’s General Counsel, involving his efforts to 
resolve account protection with T3/Thurston. The District Court reviewed those 41 documents in 
camera and rejected privilege for nearly all on the basis that they concerned “factual matters and 
business advice about the cross-over customers made in Dunlap’s capacity as corporate secretary 
rather than purely legal issues.” [R. 2226.] As demonstrated below, the District Court erred as to 
the legal standard of attorney-client privilege and materially prejudiced SBS. Specifically, 
Exhibits 157, 245, 266-70, 326-30, 336, 338, 352, 356-60, 362 (the “Privileged Documents”) 
were ordered produced and used by T3/Thurston in both the trial and arbitration. 
The standard of review is “abuse of discretion” with the additional requirement that any 
error must have affected a substantial right. See Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 134 
Idaho 46, 50-51, 995 P.2d 816, 820-21 (2000). In regard to attorney-client privilege specifically, 
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the conclusion that a substantial right was impacted by improper disclosure is virtually 
automatic. See, e.g., Frontier Refining, Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., Inc., 136 F.3d 695, 706 (10th 
Cir. 1998) (“There is too great a risk that a jury would accord significant or undue weight to the 
testimony and admissions of a party’s own lawyers.”). Indeed, this Court has stated the 
prejudicial effect of such an error “is obvious.” State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 621, 682 P.2d 
571, 574 (1984) (ruling erroneous disclosure mandated reversal of criminal conviction).   
The applicable legal standard for attorney-client privilege in Idaho is established by the 
rule of evidence that provides a party with a right to not disclose “confidential communications 
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client.” 
I.R.E. 502(b). The District Court identified that rule as controlling [R. 2220], but proceeded to 
water it down in two ways—(i) by creating a presumption against in-house attorneys and (ii) by 
construing the privilege to encompass only “purely legal matters”—then misapplied that 
weakened standard to Dunlap’s internal communications about account protection matters. 
First, there is no presumption against in-house attorneys. I.R.E. 502(b) does not 
distinguish between inside or outside counsel and refers only to a “lawyer.” Yet, the District 
Court unilaterally declared the standard “stricter” for an in-house counsel; so much so that it 
would presume their communications are not for a legal purpose. [See R. 2221.] That was 
incorrect. Nothing in I.R.E. 502 creates a presumption and the majority of courts nationwide 
recognize a “lawyer’s status as in-house counsel does not dilute the privilege.” In re Kellogg 
Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also, e.g., United States v. Rowe, 96 
F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996) (“In determining the existence of a privilege, no attempt is made 
to distinguish between inside and outside counsel.”). Indeed, this Court has not applied a 
presumption against in-house attorneys in prior cases. See, e.g., Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 
Idaho 697, 704, 116 P.3d 27, 34 (2005) (applying privilege to in-house counsel without bias).  
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Second, the District Court erred by construing the privilege to cover only “purely legal 
matters” (and doing so inconsistently between the parties). [R. 2226.] I.R.E. 502(b) states it 
applies to any communication made to “facilitate … legal services.” That is much broader than 
the District Court allowed and, indeed, the entire reason for the privilege is to encourage “full 
and frank communication” between lawyer and client, see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 
383, 389 (1981), as also reflected in the comments of the Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee:  
The rule is intended to provide the privilege to all communications between the 
attorney and client, and to others necessary to the communication process or the 
rendition of professional legal services …. 
M. CLARK, REPORT OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR EVIDENCE COMMITTEE, C502, p.6 re Subsection 
(b) (Dec. 16, 1983, Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). That goal necessarily requires discussing 
facts and business matters related to legal services and, as such, courts routinely apply the 
privilege to “counseling and planning” and “business decision-making” when an attorney is 
involved due to his or her “knowledge and discretion in the law.” See United States v. Chen, 99 
F.3d 1495, 1501-02 (9th Cir. 1996).8 Further, communications about negotiations a lawyer 
engages in with a third party inherently entail the discussion of non-privileged facts, but the 
lawyer-client communication nevertheless remains privileged. See Studiengesellschaft v. 
Novamont, No. 77 Civ. 4722, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15042 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1980) 
(ruling privilege applies to internal communications regarding attorney negotiations if dispute is 
“essentially a legal one involving rights and duties under … [a] contract.”).9 Thus, contrary to the 
8 See also Willnerd, 2010 WL 5391270 at *3 (“Open communication assists lawyers in rendering 
legal advice, not only to represent their clients in ongoing litigation, but also to prevent litigation 
by advising clients to conform their conduct to the law and by addressing legal concerns that 
may inhibit clients from engaging in otherwise lawful and socially beneficial activities.”). 
9 See id. at *5-6 (privilege applied because attorney-negotiator’s “purpose was to resolve an 
essentially legal dispute, in circumstances marked by legal uncertainty. In those circumstances, 
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District Court’s view, the communication of even purely non-legal matters is protected if the 
overall purpose involves a legal service. I.R.E. 502(b); Willnerd v. Sybase, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-
500-BLW, 2010 WL 5391270 at *3 (D. Idaho Dec. 22, 2010) (the “communication[] of facts are 
privileged even if the original facts are not”). Notably, the District Court recognized as much 
when ruling T3/Thurston’s attorney agreements were not discoverable [see R. 2225 (noting 
parties can be compelled to testify as to facts “but the communication [between lawyer and 
client] itself remains privileged”)], yet applied a different standard for SBS’s privilege. It is hard 
to reconcile the District Court’s about-face on that legal point as anything less than arbitrary. 
Compared to the proper legal standard, it is clear the District Court abused its discretion 
in ordering the Privileged Documents produced because they are all confidential internal 
communications between lawyer and client representatives made in the overall context10 of a 
legal service being provided by SBS’s General Counsel, Michael Dunlap [see R. 1875-76 (¶ 5)], 
regardless of whether they encompassed factual or business matters. For example: 
 Exhibit 245 is an email between SBS’s lawyer, Dunlap, and SBS employees 
specifically concerning his “account protection resolution work.” [See also
Ex. 269 (referring to “IBF account protection”), Ex. 157 (containing 
statements from Dunlap about “honor[ing] account protection”).] 
 Exhibit 266 is an email between Dunlap and IBF’s post-acquisition manager, 
Tressa McLaughlin—at a time when IBF was an affiliate of SBS—concerning 
his actions were informed by his legal expertise. That his goal may have been to make the most 
financially favorable deal possible for his client does not alter these facts.”); see also Boss Mfg. 
Co. v. Hugo Boss AG, No. 97 CIV. 8495, 1999 WL 47324 SHS MHD, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 
1999) (privilege applied to internal discussion of commercial matters because “fundamental 
consideration animating the discussions and counsel’s involvement in those discussions was the 
need to protect the legal interests of Hugo Boss”). 
10 See In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., No. 14-md-02521-WHO, 2015 WL 7566741 at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 25, 2015) (report by attorney of settlement negotiations protected when, “considered 
as a whole and in context,” it was made in connection with a legal purpose). 
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details of the accounts Dunlap was addressing with T3. [See also Ex. 269 
(continuation of same); Ex. 352 (Dunlap giving input on same to client).] 
 Exhibit 327 is an email from Dunlap to SBS’s President, J.J. Sorrenti, 
speaking of a “risk” in account protection interpretation he identified from his 
past negotiations. [See also Ex. 267 (Dunlap noting he was “represent[ing] his 
client”); Ex. 336 (Dunlap reporting thoughts to Sorrenti about negotiations 
with T3), Ex. 330 (same); Exs. 358, 360 (Sorrenti requesting Dunlap’s review 
of draft communication regarding account protection).] 
Certainly a few of the Privileged Documents could be interpreted to contain unflattering 
comments that T3/Thurston will no doubt seek to highlight [see, e.g., Ex. 357 (Sorrenti 
expressing frustration with T3 negotiations, stating: “… She’s not impressing me [and] she 
should be trying.”); Ex. 359 (Dunlap asserting “… she doesn’t have an or else”)], but they all 
occurred within the context of efforts to resolve account protection and, thus, fall within the 
realm of “full and frank” discussion. Indeed, T3 and Thurston have consistently stressed that 
Dunlap’s efforts were nothing less than an attempt to address rights and duties under their 
contracts [see Tr. Vol. I at 888:20-890:1] or to “avoid litigation” [see R. 4437 (Thurston Decl., ¶ 
14)], which directly resulted in the Privileged Documents. [See, e.g., Tr. Vol. II at 1282:2-15 
(testimony regarding Exhibit 327), 1302:23-1304:21 (testimony regarding Exhibit 359).] 
As a result, the District Court’s characterization of Dunlap as acting in a business role in 
regard to the Privileged Documents, due to his secondary title of corporate secretary, was not an 
“exercise of reason.” In-house attorneys often hold such a title, but only for record-keeping 
purposes. See Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 790 n.38 (Del. Ch. 2016) 
(discussing duties of corporate secretary). It was not rational for the District Court to conclude 
that Dunlap’s negotiations with T3/Thurston about account protection, and subsequent internal 
communications, were done as a corporate secretary rather than a lawyer. Providing a legal 
service was Dunlap’s primary function. As expected of in-house counsel, his role in pre-
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acquisition due diligence was to assess the legal risks [see Ex. 48 at 48.9; Tr. Vol. I at 467:16-18, 
1133:21-1134:10; Tr. Vol. II at 2014:19-2015:5] and then try to address those legal risks by 
negotiating directly with T3/Thurston. [See Tr. Vol. I at 371:8-21, 416:7-10.] The written 
agreements that resulted from those negotiations, each executed by T3 and Thurston, expressly 
state they were a “resolution” of account protection issues. [See Ex. 1009, 1063.]  
Accepting the District Court’s reasoning would effectively negate the ability of in-house 
lawyers to counsel their clients on a day-to-day basis, creating a loophole that undermines the 
established law and public policy favoring full and frank internal discussions between lawyers 
and clients. The District Court abused its discretion. This Court should: (i) reverse the District 
Court’s order of March 24, 2016; (ii) require T3/Thurston and their counsel to return or destroy 
all privileged information; and (iii) vacate both the arbitration award and trial judgment. 
B. The Arbitration Award Should be Vacated Because the Privileged 
Documents Were Used and Relied on by the Arbitration Panel.  
As noted previously, the erroneous admission of attorney-client privileged material 
inherently prejudices the right to a fair proceeding. See Iwakiri, 106 Idaho at 621; see also 
Frontier Refining, 136 F.3d at 706. That consequence is logically the same regardless of whether 
the adjudication occurs by way of a trial or arbitration. Nevertheless, to the extent the District 
Court’s error is subject to being treated differently in this appeal because it resulted in an 
Arbitration Award, the strong public policy behind attorney-client privilege still requires vacatur.  
Federal courts reviewing arbitration awards have long recognized and applied a rule that 
they will not uphold an award if it would require a court to sanction a violation of public policy. 
See Aramark Facility Servs. v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 530 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(noting it is a “now-settled rule that a court need not, in fact cannot, enforce an award which 
violates public policy”) (citation omitted). For an arbitration award to violate public policy, there 
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must be: (1) “an explicit, well defined and dominant policy”; and (2) “the policy should be one 
that specifically militates against the relief ordered by the arbitrator.” Id. The erroneous 
disclosure of the Privileged Documents in this case qualifies under both prongs.  
First, it is indisputable that the attorney-client privilege is a “well defined and dominant 
policy” under federal law, Texas law, and long-standing Idaho law.11 Second, that dominant 
policy is upheld in this circumstance only by vacating the Arbitration Award because the 
privileged information was explicitly relied upon by the Panel for its decision-making. In fact, 
several Privileged Documents are directly quoted throughout the award:   
 Exhibit 157 is quoted at Paragraphs 32, 111, and 129 of the Interim 
Award [R. 8122, 8137-38, 8141-42];  
 Exhibit 327 is quoted at Paragraphs 32 and 111 of the Interim Award [R. 
8122, 8137-38];  
 Exhibit 330 is quoted at Paragraph 129 of the Interim Award [R. 8141-
42]; and  
 Exhibit 359 is quoted at Paragraph 128 of the Interim Award. [R. 8141.] 
Accordingly, the risk identified by the Tenth Circuit in Frontier Refining—that a 
factfinder “would accord significant or undue weight to the testimony and admissions of a 
party’s own lawyers,” 136 F.3d at 706—is readily apparent from the Arbitration Award itself. 
11 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (“The attorney–client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for 
confidential communications known to the common law.”) (citation omitted); Paxton v. City of 
Dallas, 509 S.W.3d 247, 259 (Tex. 2017) (“The attorney-client privilege holds a special place 
among privileges: it is the oldest and most venerated of the common law privileges of 
confidential communications. As the most sacred of all legally recognized privileges, its 
preservation is essential to the just and orderly operation of our legal system. … The attorney-
client privilege exists—and has been a cornerstone of our legal system for nearly 500 years—
because the interests protected and secured by the promise of confidentiality are not merely 
significant; they are quintessentially imperative.”) (citations and editing omitted); Ex parte 
Niday, 15 Idaho 559, 566, 98 P. 845 (1908) (recognizing privilege early in 1900s). 
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Like this Court did in Iwakiri, 106 Idaho at 621, it should reverse the result of the District 
Court’s error, which, in this instance, means vacating the entire Arbitration Award. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING SBS’S MOTION TO VACATE THE AWARD 
BASED ON THE ARBITRATION PANEL EXCEEDING ITS POWER. 
As noted, a substantial prejudicial consequence of the District Court’s error in striking the 
Dallas forum and ordering the parties’ to arbitrate in Idaho was the tribunal formed by the 
AAA’s Denver office had no prior experience with Texas law. [See R. 13822-29.] Predictably, 
that Panel proceeded to ignore and misinterpret several aspects of Texas law (as well as 
misconstrue factual issues). Under the FAA, ordinary factual and legal errors usually cannot be 
corrected because, in agreeing to arbitrate, a party trades full appellate review for speed and 
informality. See Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 815, 118 P.3d 141, 147 (2005). Of 
course, as detailed in connection with Issue 1, SBS did not receive the Dallas-administered 
arbitration for which it bargained. The Arbitration Award should be vacated for that reason 
alone. Nonetheless, the Panel’s award of $4.3 million so greatly contradicts express contractual 
limitations on damages, manifestly disregards the parties’ choice of Texas law, and defies 
rationality (as well as violates public policy) that the award itself is contrary to the agreement to 
arbitrate. When arbitrators exceed their power in such a way, their decisions are no longer 
entitled to any deference. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671 
(2010) (arbitrator’s “own brand of industrial justice” unenforceable); see also PoolRe Ins. Corp. 
v. Org. Strategies, Inc., 783 F.3d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 2015) (“However, where the arbitrator 
exceeds the express limitations of his contractual mandate, judicial deference is at an end.”). 
To be clear, arbitration arises solely from—and an arbitrator’s power is consequently 
constrained by—the agreement of the parties. Thus, the FAA provides for vacating an award 
“where the arbitrators exceeded their powers,” 9 U.S.C § 10(a)(4), which can occur in several 
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ways, including: not applying the parties’ choice of law; violating other terms of their contract; 
or issuing an award contrary to public policy. [See Standards of Review, supra, pp. 9-10.] In 
addition, federal courts have interpreted FAA § 10(a)(4) such that an award must be vacated 
when an arbitrator “manifestly disregards” the law or the award is “completely irrational.” This 
Court fully recognizes and applies those standards to an arbitration award governed by the FAA. 
See Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 101 Idaho 557, 564-66, 617 P.2d 861, 868-70 (1980); 
see also Carroll v. MBNA Am. Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 265 n.2, 220 P.3d 1080, 1084 n.2 (2009); 
Barbee v. WMA Sec., Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 396 n.4, 146 P.3d 657, 662 n.4 (2006).  
SBS thus seeks to vacate T3’s Arbitration Award on the grounds that the Panel exceeded 
its power and violated the FAA by: (i) ignoring the parties’ choice of Texas law to declare the 
distributorship “constructively terminated” based on Connecticut/New Jersey statutes; (ii) 
irrationally ruling T3 could recover future losses as if the contract continued while also 
terminating the contract and excusing T3 from its post-termination obligations in the contract; 
(iii) awarding gross profits in manifest disregard of Texas law requiring proof of “net” loss; (iv) 
awarding 8-12 years of future damages despite an undisputed month-to-month term of the 
contract; and (v) re-writing the contract to award attorneys’ fees and expenses on the basis of 
AAA procedural rules, and doubling the fees incurred by T3 to award an amount far beyond the 
express contractual limit of “actual damages for commercial loss.”  
If this Court does not grant relief on the basis of Issues 1 or 2, SBS requests the Court 
vacate the Arbitration Award under the standards of federal arbitration law.  
A. The Panel Exceeded its Power by Declaring a “Constructive Termination” 
Based on Connecticut/New Jersey Law. 
Paragraph 18 of the Distributor Agreement provides that “the distributorship and the 
relationship between [T3] and Safeguard will be governed and construed under and in 
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accordance with the laws of Texas ….” [R. 7717.] Yet, the Panel paid no heed to that mandate by 
awarding $566,143.61 to T3 for a supposed “constructive termination” of its distributorship on 
the basis of non-Texas law. [R. 8134-35 at ¶¶ 97-101.] In doing so, the Panel exceeded its power.  
To begin with, no party sought a constructive termination [see Tr. Vol. III at 684:2-15 
(T3’s counsel acknowledging to District Court that the Panel came up with the termination 
theory on its own)].12 Then, to support its manufactured theory, the Panel expressly relied on 
four cases outside of Texas law. [R. 8134-35 (¶ 98).] Two cases cited by the Panel declared a 
constructive termination based on other states’ statutes—Connecticut and New Jersey13—and the 
other two did not involve (or mention) termination at all.14 Under the Ninth Circuit’s standard in
Coutee v. Barington Capital, an arbitrator’s failure to adhere to the parties’ choice of law 
violates FAA § 10(a)(4) if it is not a “harmless error,” meaning the arbitrator could not have 
12 T3 did seek (not in its arbitration demand, but only in briefing later) to “revoke acceptance of 
the franchise and return it to Safeguard for its market value” based on Texas’s version of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. [See R. 7838, 7998 (¶ 123).] Revoking acceptance, however, is 
fundamentally different from termination. Revocation puts the parties back in the position they 
would have been had no contract formed, while termination concedes a valid contract existed. 
Accordingly, if the Panel had granted T3’s request for revocation, there would no distributorship 
to value at $566,143.61. Thus it is doubly baffling that the Panel denied T3’s “revocation” theory 
[see R. 8134-35 (¶¶ 97-98)] but nevertheless proceeded to craft a constructive termination theory 
on its own outside of Texas law to award T3 the entire value of its distributorship.  
13 In Petereit v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 63 F.3d 1169 (2d Cir. 1995), distributors of baked-bread 
products claimed they should be treated as franchisors under the Connecticut Franchise Act and 
argued they were “constructively terminated” when the manufacturer realigned their geographic 
territories. The Second Circuit affirmed a ruling that, under the Connecticut statute, the 
distributors were “constructively terminated.” In Maintainco, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar 
Forklift Am., Inc., 408 N.J. Super. 461, 474–75, 975 A.2d 510, 518 (App. Div. 2009), a New 
Jersey court held it was a “constructive termination” under the New Jersey Franchise Act for a 
franchisor to “directly or indirectly … cancel or fail to renew a franchise without good cause.”   
14 The Panel’s reliance on Gossard v. Adia Servs., Inc., 723 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1998) and Carvel 
Corp. v. Baker, 79 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D. Conn. 1997), is puzzling. There is no termination in either.  
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made the same award under the proper law. 336 F.3d 1128, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the 
Panel could not have declared a constructive termination under Texas law. Texas does not have a 
franchise statute and no court in Texas has approved a theory for “constructive termination” of a 
franchisee. Therefore, the Panel’s violation was not harmless error.  
At the trial court level, however, T3 argued—and the District Court accepted—a 
contention that, since no Texas court had affirmatively “rejected”15 a constructive termination 
theory, the Panel was merely “looking to persuasive case law to determine how a Texas court 
may rule” if presented with the issue. [R. 12746.] That was error because no court (and certainly 
no arbitrator) has authority to create new statutory rights as the Panel did here and there is no 
authority interpreting the FAA in a way that allows an arbitrator to predict or make new law of 
any kind. Given that an arbitrator’s power arises solely from the parties’ agreement, they must 
apply the law chosen by the parties as it exists as opposed to speculating how a court or 
legislature could change, extend, or add to that law in the future because, otherwise, the parties’ 
choice of law is eviscerated. Arbitrators would be free to disregard the chosen law at will and 
award whatever they want under the guise of “predicting” how that law might change in the 
future. This Court should not sanction such an unprecedented and limitless expansion of 
arbitrator power under the FAA.  
15 The District Court found it particularly relevant that SBS had “not pointed to any Texas 
authority contradicting or rejecting the [constructive termination] theory.” [R. 12746.] SBS 
maintains it is not proper to require a party to prove a negative—i.e., that something which does 
not exist in Texas law has been rejected by a court—but, when it became clear at the hearing this 
was an issue for the District Court, SBS requested, and was not granted, the opportunity for 
supplemental briefing. [See Tr. Vol. III at 641:10-21.] More research has since been done and, in 
this Court’s de novo review, SBS notes that Texas previously had a statute applicable to certain 
“dealer agreements” similar to the New Jersey and Connecticut statutes, but it was repealed in 
2011. See TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE Ch. 55 (West 2011) [Repealed by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., 
Ch. 1039 (H.B. 3079) § 3, eff. Sept. 1, 2011]. As such, in that regard, Texas has affirmatively 
rejected any constructive termination theory that could arise from a franchise statute.    
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Further, the suggestion that the Panel in this matter was attempting to predict how a 
Texas court may rule if asked to declare a constructive termination is a fiction created by T3’s 
attorneys after-the-fact because: (i) no request for termination was ever presented to the Panel 
and (ii) there is no suggestion in the Interim Award that the Panel was predicting Texas law. 
Quite the contrary, the Panel skipped past Texas law to grant T3 new statutory rights on the basis 
of Connecticut/New Jersey franchise acts. That is the epitome of an arbitrator improperly doling 
out his or her “own brand of industrial justice.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 671.  
Therefore, the Arbitration Award must be vacated in full under FAA § 10(a)(4) or, in the 
alternative, vacated at least in regard to the constructive termination ruling (representing 
$566,143.61 in damages) and Fee Order ($2,449,208.14) since, under Texas law, attorneys’ fees 
are predicated on each specific “cause of action” upon which a party prevails. See, e.g., Green 
Int’l, Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. 1997) (“A failure to segregate attorney’s fees in a 
case containing multiple causes of action, only some of which entitle the recovery of attorney’s 
fees, can result in the recovery of zero attorney’s fees.”). 
B. The Panel Irrationally Contradicted Law and Logic by Terminating the 
Contract and, at the Same Time, Awarding Future Contract Benefits.
Shortly after the Panel issued its Interim Award declaring a constructive termination, 
SBS requested clarification as to T3’s post-termination obligations in the contract. [R. 8146-48.] 
In response, T3 declared it was electing a full discharge due to breach. [Id.] The Panel accepted 
that election and thus issued the Supplement to Interim Award that defied all reason by both
discharging T3 from all its post-termination obligations under the contract (including a non-
compete and requirement to return SBS’s confidential information) while still awarding 8-12 
years of future damages as if the contract continued in force.  
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It is a basic principle of law that, when a contract is materially breached, the non-
breaching party must elect to: (i) treat the breach as discharging all future performance (which 
applies to both parties) or (ii) continue performance and demand the same from the other party. 
If the non-breaching party demands any future performance from the other party, it remains 
bound to all its own obligations under the contract. See Henry v. Masson, 333 S.W.3d 825, 840 
(Tex. App. 2010). As such, a plaintiff cannot both be discharged from its own obligations and 
receive future performance from the other party, whether termed a present value of future 
damages or otherwise. See id. at 840-41. If a party elects discharge from its future obligations, as 
T3 did here, then the contract immediately ends and both parties have no further obligations. 
[See R. 19652.] T3’s expert on damages, Robert Taylor, discussed that elementary point when he 
testified before the Panel that, if the distributorship were to end at any time, “then there would be 
no number for the future.” [R. 7900 at 1666:16-21 (emphasis added).] The Arbitration Award 
violates that clear principle of law and logic by granting T3 future benefits for 8-12 years 
[R. 8133-34 (¶¶ 92-94)] while also declaring the Distributor Agreement “is hereby terminated” 
and T3 is “excuse[d] of any performance … of the post term covenant against competition,” and 
further allowing T3 to illegally keep SBS’s confidential information. [See R. 8151-52 (¶¶ 136-
138); R. 7715 (¶ 13) (T3 agreeing customer lists are “confidential information belonging to 
Safeguard”).] Such inconsistency defies reason. There is no conceivable way T3 can have both.16
As a result, the Arbitration Award must be vacated as “completely irrational.” An award 
is completely irrational when it “fails to draw its essence from the agreement of the parties,” 
16 Under Paragraph 12(A) of the Distributor Agreement, T3 could receive 50% of its historical 
commissions for two years after a termination. [R. 7713.] However, the Panel’s future damages 
could not be supported on the basis of Paragraph 12(A) because that provision is subject to post-
termination conditions that still conflict with T3’s election of discharge. [Id.] 
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Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 2009), which means “an 
award may not stand if it does not meet the test of fundamental rationality.” Swift Indus., Inc. v. 
Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972) (ruling $6 million cash bond to cover 
max liability of $1.5 million not yet incurred was irrational). 
A controlling example of how the Panel’s award is “completely irrational” comes from 
the facts of the Ninth Circuit’s Comedy Club opinion. In that case, the arbitrator’s decision to 
revoke a defendant’s (CCI’s) license to open new clubs under the “Improv” brand, while 
simultaneously enforcing a non-compete preventing CCI from opening other non-Improv clubs, 
was rational because the trademark agreement at issue had not been terminated. See Comedy 
Club, 553 F.3d at 1289, 1290 n. 14. Rather, the plaintiff (Improv West) elected to continue the 
contract and enforce performance as to the clubs CCI owned and would continue to operate for 
the remaining term of the agreement (to 2019). Id. The Ninth Circuit specifically stressed, 
however, that the arbitrator’s decision would have been irrational if the opposite occurred: i.e., if 
the plaintiff had elected to end the contract. See id. at 1288 (“Both parties agree that if the 
Trademark Agreement is no longer in effect then the … covenant not to compete similarly would 
no longer be in effect, and the arbitrator’s award would be considered irrational.”). The inverse 
scenario condemned as irrational by Comedy Club is precisely what the Panel did here. The 
Arbitration Award fully terminates the contract at T3’s own election (awarding $566,143.61 as 
the lost market value of its entire distributorship), yet inconsistently treats the contract as 
continuing to also award $373,473.76 in future commissions for 8-12 years. Under Comedy 
Club, that inherent contradiction is “completely irrational” and requires the award to be vacated.  
In addition, awarding post-termination future damages without requiring T3 to comply 
with its own obligations violates the express contract limitation that only “actual damages for 
commercial loss” could be awarded (thereby crossing into prohibited punitive/exemplary 
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damages). [See R. 7717 (¶ 17(C)), 7719 (¶ 21(B)).] The award should be vacated for that reason 
as well. See, e.g., Coast Trading Co., Inc. v. Pac. Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 
1982) (vacating award as “contrary to remedies provided in the contract”). 
Moreover, an award of the entire alleged lost market value of the distributorship, plus 
future damages, is a double recovery that is against public policy. Again, to vacate on such 
grounds, there must be an “explicit, well defined and dominant policy” and it must be “one that 
specifically militates against the relief ordered by the arbitrator.” Aramark Facility Servs. v. Serv. 
Emps. Int’l Union, 530 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2008). Under well-established Texas law, double 
recoveries are against public policy because they violate the “one satisfaction” rule. Tony Gullo 
Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. 2006) (“There can be but one recovery for 
one injury, and the fact that there may be more than one theory of liability does not modify this 
rule.”); Temple v. FDIC, 988 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The one satisfaction rule is based on 
the notion that allowing a double recovery is ordinarily against public policy.”); see Am. Foreign 
Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 399, 94 P.3d 699, 704 (Idaho 2004) (same).  
As a result, the Arbitration Award must be vacated either: (i) as “completely irrational”; 
(ii) for violating an express contract prohibition; or (iii) on grounds of public policy. 
In response to SBS’s motion to vacate at the District Court level, T3 asserted the Panel’s 
award was not irrational when characterizing the $373,473.76 amount not as “future benefits 
under the T3 Distributor Agreement,” but instead as part of a “lost asset value going forward.” 
[R. 8454.] The District Court adopted that view. [R. 12747 (using same “lost asset going 
forward” phrase).] However, that was plain error because, to the extent the Panel’s award is valid 
at all, T3 is bound by the arbitrators’ findings on disputed facts no less than is SBS and the Panel 
repeatedly declared it was awarding $373,473.76 for future lost commissions [see R. 8133-34 (¶¶ 
92-94)], while $566,143.61 was awarded as the lost market value of T3’s entire business. [See R. 
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8135 (¶ 100).] Under the FAA, the District Court was required to defer to the Panel’s findings on 
those points. See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1102 (9th 
Cir. 2003). If the District Court had followed that law instead of deferring to T3’s re-
characterization of the futures damages awarded by the Panel, it would have been left with no 
choice but to conclude the Arbitration Award contains a fundamental inconsistency that cannot 
be upheld. This Court, exercising its de novo review, should vacate the Arbitration Award in full 
or, alternatively, at least strike the future damages element ($373,473.76). 
C. The Panel Manifestly Disregarded Texas Law and the Contract to Award 
Damages Based on Gross Profits Rather Than Net Profit.
Additionally, the Panel’s award of “lost commissions” (past and future) was a manifest 
disregard of Texas law because the amounts were based on gross profits and revenue instead of a 
net commission payable to T3 under the terms of its contract. To be clear, distributors like T3 act 
solely as sales agents [see R. 7704 (¶ 5(A)) (contract stating “[t]he relationship between 
Safeguard and you shall be that of principal and independent sales agent …”)] who solicit orders 
to be placed with SBS in return for a commission of around 30-35% on completed sales. [See
R. 7899 at 1662:16-1663:6.]17 That is the most a distributor could receive under its contract in 
regard to any account protection claim. Further, T3 and SBS expressly bargained that, upon a 
“termination” by either party, the most T3 could receive in the future was, subject to certain 
post-termination obligations,18 a reduced percentage of commissions as to repeat sales, and only 
for two years, as provided in Paragraph 12(A) of the contract: 
17 Once a customer places an order with a distributor, SBS handles all other aspects of a sale—
e.g., invoicing, shipping, collecting payment, guarantees, returns—and a commission is remitted 
to the distributor.  [See generally R. 8111 (¶ 1).] 
18 Paragraph 12(A) makes post-termination payments subject to a non-compete and return of 
SBS’s confidential information, which is inconsistent with T3’s discharge. [See, supra, note 16]. 
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If Safeguard terminates this Agreement for any of the reasons set forth in 
Paragraph 10 … or if you terminate this Agreement, Safeguard will … pay you 
(or your beneficiaries) for two (2) years after the effective date of termination, 
fifty percent (50%) of the commissions generated on all repeat sales of Safeguard 
Systems that are made during such period to customers from whom you were 
entitled to receive commissions while this Agreement was still in effect …  
[R. 7714 (¶ 12(A)).] The Panel, however, awarded “gross profits” to T3 on past sales by 
DocuSource/IBF and “one times annual revenue” for future sales (representing 8-12 years of 
commissions into the future). That was a manifest disregard of the controlling Texas law.    
Under Ninth Circuit precedent, manifest disregard occurs when the record shows an 
arbitrator “recognized the applicable law and then ignored it.” Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1290. 
The law ignored must be “well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.”  Carter v. Health Net of 
Cal., Inc., 374 F.3d 830, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). At the lower court level, the District Court added a 
further requirement that an arbitrator must first explicitly “state” in writing the law being ignored 
before it rises to the level of manifest disregard. [See R. 12743-44.] That was an error of law as 
to the legal standard because it allows arbitrators to disregard applicable law by simply not 
writing it out in their award. Rather, as stated in Comedy Club, the standard turns on whether an 
arbitrator “recognized” the law. 553 F.3d at 1290. The Second Circuit has ruled that to mean the 
applicable law can be: (i) “imputed” by what the parties identified to the arbitrators, or (ii) 
“inferred” if the controlling law is “so obvious that it would be instantly perceived as such by the 
average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.” Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness 
Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 390 (2d Cir. 2003). That is the legal standard the District Court 
should have applied and, when done here, it is clear the “well defined … explicit” Texas law 
requiring proof of net profit lost was applicable and manifestly disregarded by the Panel. 
First, Texas law explicitly provides the “correct measure of damages for loss of profits is 
net profits” and that damages may not be based on “gross revenue or gross profits.” Exel Transp. 
36 
47140.0001.10672375.1 
Servs., Inc. v. Aim High Logistics Servs., LLC, 323 S.W.3d 224, 232 (Tex. App. 2010). Net 
profits are “what remains in the conduct of business after deducting from its total receipts all of 
the expenses incurred in carrying on the business.” Id. As such, Texas courts reverse awards 
where there is no “showing that expenses were deducted in arriving at net profits lost.” See, e.g., 
Texaco, Inc. v. Phan, 137 S.W.3d 763, 772 (Tex. App. 2004). Second, the record reflects the 
controlling Texas law was “clearly applicable.” Both T3 and its expert, Robert Taylor, 
acknowledged that commissions are not calculated until after fees are deducted. [See R. 7880 at 
1273:7-19, R. 7898 at 1627:17-1628:16, 7900 at 1668:2-13; see also R. 7737, 19641.] Yet, 
Taylor did not do that for his damage calculations. [R. 7900 at 1667:4-8 (“Q. And all that you 
did, again, with respect to this category, was look at the gross profit of IBF, correct? A. Yes, sir. 
That was the ultimate number.”). He simply took the sales of DocuSource/IBF—i.e., the retail 
price paid by customers—and subtracted an accounting concept called the “base price” to derive 
gross profits. [See, e.g., R. 7920-21 (“Grand Total-Sales”), 7922-23 (“Grand Total-Base Price”), 
7924-25 (“Grand Total-GP”); see also R. 19642.] Further, in regard to future commissions, 
Taylor used a “one times annual revenue” metric that covered at least 8-12 years. [R. 7896 at 
1606:17-1608:9, 7899-7900 at 1665:22-1666:8.] Third, the Panel was explicitly informed that 
Texas law does not allow damages to be based on gross profits or revenue. SBS’s post-hearing 
brief identified the precise Texas cases recited above [see R. 8102-03 (¶ 100)] and detailed the 
insufficiency of Taylor’s calculations.  [R. 8070 (¶ 64).] T3 offered no controverting law and, in 
fact, boldly declared it sought gross profits. [See R. 7994 (¶ 103).]   
Despite being made aware of the controlling Texas law, the Panel adopted Taylor’s 
calculations to award gross profits on sales in the amount of $321,657.7719 [R. 8129 (¶ 70), 8133 
19 [See R. 7946 (Taylor’s “gross profits” of $315,756.18 for IBF and $5,901.59 for DocuSource 
add up to the Panel’s $321,657.77).] 
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(¶ 91)] and future damages of $373,473.76 based on Taylor’s revenue metric (although, unlike 
Thurston’s trial, that was at least reduced to account for the undisputed fact DocuSource no 
longer sold in Idaho). [R. 8134 (¶¶ 93-94); see also R. 8129 (¶ 71).] Accordingly, this Court 
should vacate the award in full or, alternatively, the total past and future damages ($695,131.53). 
D. The Panel Manifestly Disregarded the Undisputed Month-to-Month Nature 
of the Contract to Award Future Losses for 8-12 Years.
Further, in regard to future lost commissions specifically, the Panel ignored that the 
distributorship unambiguously existed only on a “month-to-month” terminable basis [R. 7711 
(¶ 10(F)); see also R. 19645], which was admitted by T3 in its testimony. [See R. 7877-78 at 
1261:18-1262:2.] As such, the terminable nature was an undisputed fact; which limits arbitrator 
power. See Coutee v. Barington Capital Grp., L.P., 336 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating 
courts cannot “confirm an arbitration award that is legally irreconcilable with the undisputed 
facts” and that, “because facts and law are often intertwined, an arbitrator’s failure to recognize 
undisputed, legally dispositive facts may properly be deemed a manifest disregard for the law”).  
Here, Taylor testified his calculation for $373,473.76 in future damages—based on the 
“one times annual revenue” metric—would compensate T3 for “8 to 12 years” into the future, or 
even into “perpetuity.” [R. 7899-7900 at 1665:22-1666:8.] Yet, as a matter of law, the term of a 
contract inherently limits the amount and availability of future profits a party could expect to 
receive as damages. See Mood v. Kronos Prods., Inc., 245 S.W.3d 8, 13 (Tex. App. 2007) 
(rejecting award of lost profits for ten years into the future when the contract could be terminated 
on sixty days’ notice); see also Atlas Copco Tools, Inc. v. Air Power Tool & Hoist, Inc., 131 
S.W.3d 203, 208 (Tex. App. 2004) (rejecting lost profits when expert did not consider year-to-
year renewable term of contract). Under the undisputed facts, the most T3 could have been 
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awarded for future losses was limited to the monthly term of the contract (i.e., 30 days of future 
losses), which is far exceeded by an award extending for 8-12 years into the future. 
SBS specifically identified the Mood and Atlas Copco cases to the Panel and discussed 
the application of Atlas Copco at length in its post-hearing briefing. [R. 8099-8101 (¶¶ 93-95), 
8104 (¶ 102).] T3, for its part, did not address the issue at all. [See generally R. 7949-8022.] Yet 
the Panel awarded the full $373,473.76 anyway. This Court should independently vacate the 8-
12 years of future losses awarded based on the undisputed month-to-month contract term. 
E. The Panel Disregarded Texas Law and Express Contract Limitations to 
Award a Doubled Amount of Attorneys’ Fees and Litigation Expenses.
The portion of the Arbitration Award granting T3 a recovery of $2,449,208.14 in 
attorneys’ fees and $437,126.28 in “expenses”—which together are more than twice the damages 
(see R. 19657)—should also be vacated. To award so much the Panel had to re-write the 
contract, which exceeds an arbitrator’s power under FAA § 10(a)(4). See, e.g., PMA Capital Ins. 
Co. v. Platinum Underwriters Bermuda, Ltd., 659 F. Supp. 2d 631, 636 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 
400 F. App’x 654 (3d Cir. 2010); Inter-City Gas Corp. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 845 F.2d 184, 
187 (8th Cir. 1988) (“The arbitrator’s authority, however, is not unlimited. Although the 
arbitrator may interpret ambiguous language, the arbitrator may not disregard or modify 
unambiguous contract provisions.”). Furthermore, the Panel’s multiplication of attorneys’ fees 
incurred (by 2.0x) violates the express contractual limit of “actual damages for commercial loss.”  
1. The Panel Could Not Rely on AAA Rule 47.   
In its Fee Order, the Panel claimed it had power to award attorneys’ fees and costs 
beyond Texas law because Paragraph 21(B) of the Distributor Agreement incorporates the 
AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules (the “Rules”). [See R. 8257-59 (relying on AAA 
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Rule 47).20] However, the contract does not state the AAA Rules would supply a substantive 
basis to govern any claim or relief. Rather, Paragraph 21(B) merely states the arbitration “shall 
be conducted” under the AAA’s Rules. [R. 7718-19 (emphasis added).] Fees and costs are 
substantive matters that are governed by the parties’ choice of Texas law. See Rapp Collins 
Worldwide, Inc. v. Mohr, 982 S.W.2d 478, 487 (Tex. App. 1998) (“We conclude the issue of 
attorneys’ fees is a substantive part of a lawsuit and therefore should be governed by the law of 
the state governing the substantive issues.”); see also Fairmont Supply Co. v. Hooks Indus., Inc., 
177 S.W.3d 529, 535–36 (Tex. App. 2005) (same). Further, as this Court has ruled before, the 
phrase “shall be conducted” reflects that the AAA Rules merely provided a procedural 
framework for arbitration and not a substantive basis for any relief. See Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 
141 Idaho 809, 817-18, 118 P.3d 141, 149-50 (2005) (ruling the AAA Rules are procedural such 
that arbitrators could not use former version of Rule 47 (i.e., rule 43) to award fees).  
Contrary to the Panel’s suggestion as well, the parties did not agree by their submissions 
to give the Panel “jurisdiction” to use AAA Rule 47 as a substantive basis to award fees and 
costs. [See R. 8258 at 2:12-18 (Panel asserting as much).] Both T3’s demand for arbitration and 
SBS’s response requested fees and costs generically [see R. 7787, 7810] and then T3’s post-
hearing briefing sought fees solely on the basis of Texas law. [R. 8177-78.] The only AAA rule 
mentioned by T3 was “Rule 43,” and then only to note it allows arbitrators to grant any relief 
proper “within the scope of the agreement of the parties.” [R. 8177.] T3 accordingly went on to 
recite that the Distributor Agreement required the application of Texas law. [See generally R.
20 AAA Rule 47 itself states arbitrators can only award relief “within the scope of the agreement 
of the parties” [see R. 8272], which points right back to the contract and Texas law. 
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8177-8202.] As a result, the question of whether attorneys’ fees were to be governed by AAA 
Rule 47 or Texas law was never an issue for the Panel to decide.  
The Panel’s use of AAA Rule 47 was not harmless error either. At a minimum, AAA 
Rule 47 was used to: (i) ignore the requirement in Texas law that a party formally “present” their 
claims before fees may be awarded [R. 8258 at 2:21-23];21 (ii) grant attorneys’ fees for 
unsegregated legal work occurring outside the Arbitration (and in the District Court Action) [R. 
8259-60 at 3:11-4:2];22 and (iii) award litigation “costs” that are specifically disallowed by Texas 
law; such as the full amount of expert witness fees.23 [R. 8258 at 2:24-28.] Accordingly, the Fee 
Order should be vacated in full. 
21 Absent evidence of timely presentment, no attorneys’ fees can be awarded. See Kahn v. Seely, 
980 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. App. 1998). The Panel shrugged off that deficiency on the basis that 
“[t]here is no AAA Commercial Rule that requires T3 to ‘present’ its demand for attorneys’ fees 
to SBS.” [See R. 8258 at 2:21-23.]  
22 Texas allows unsegregated fees only for intertwined claims, not proceedings. See Tony Gullo 
Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 311 (Tex. 2006) (“[F]ee claimants have always been 
required to segregate fees between claims for which they are recoverable and claims for which 
they are not”) (emphasis added); see also Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 
S.W.2d 812, 819 (Tex. 1997) (stating “jury must decide the question of attorney’s fees 
specifically in light of the work performed in the very case for which the fee is sought.”) 
(emphasis added). The Panel ignored that by awarding fees incurred in the District Court Action.   
23 The Panel awarded T3 litigation expenses—e.g., expert witness fees ($220,000), postage 
($8,000), document vendor fees ($27,000), and $34,000 in photocopying/binders—as “costs” [R. 
8199-820] when costs in Texas are strictly limited to “those paid to courts or their officers.” In re 
Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168, 175 (Tex. 2013); see also Bundren v. Holly 
Oaks Townhomes Ass’n, 347 S.W.3d 421, 440 (Tex. App. 2011) (expert witness fees not 
recoverable); Shenandoah Assocs. v. J & K Properties, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 470, 487 (Tex. App. 
1987) (barring all “expenses incurred in preparation of trial”). Indeed, Nalle explicitly rejected 
the notion that “litigation costs” are recoverable. 406 S.W.3d at 175-76. Yet, the Panel granted 
T3 all the expenses it sought to recover on the basis that “costs” in Texas were only a “subset of 
the larger category of expenses” recoverable under AAA Rule 47. [R. 8258 at 2:24-28.]  
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2. The Doubled Attorneys’ Fees Violate an Express Contract Limit of 
“Actual Damages for Commercial Loss.”   
Furthermore, in its Fee Order, the Panel determined the “actual attorneys’ fees” incurred 
by T3 were $1,222,604.07 and then applied a “2.0 multiplier” to double that to $2,449,208.14. 
[R. 8263 at 7:4-10; see also R. 19657, 19664.] Texas law allows a lodestar amount (hours 
worked multiplied by a “reasonable” rate) to be increased by a multiplier in some instances, but 
there is no authority for a windfall recovery of millions in fees beyond any actual loss. [See R. 
8253 (citing cases).] The Distributor Agreement unambiguously states that all amounts 
recoverable by either party “… SHALL BE LIMITED TO ACTUAL DAMAGES FOR 
COMMERCIAL LOSS” and specifically bars punitive/exemplary awards. [R. 7717 (¶ 17(C)); 
see also 7719 (¶ 21(B)).] The Panel plainly violated that express limitation on its power, which is 
a violation of the FAA. See, e.g., Coast Trading Co., Inc. v. Pac. Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 
1198 (9th Cir. 1982) (vacating award as “contrary to remedies provided in the contract”). The 
most the Panel legitimately had power to award in attorneys’ fees were those it determined T3 
had actually incurred. This Court, in its de novo review, should vacate the Fee Order. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and the record, SBS requests this Court to: 
1. Reverse the District Court’s ruling that it had jurisdiction to consider T3’s 
objection to forum [R. 984] and vacate the resulting Arbitration Award or, alternatively (if 
jurisdiction existed), reverse the District Court’s ruling that Texas law requires striking the 
Dallas forum [R. 989-90] and vacate the resulting Arbitration Award for violating FAA § 5; 
2. Reverse the District Court’s overruling of SBS’s attorney-client privilege [R. 
2227] and order: (a) T3 and its counsel to return and/or destroy all privileged information 
disclosed to them; and (b) that the Arbitration Award is vacated in full;  
3. Vacate the Arbitration Award under FAA § 10(a)(4) and corresponding federal 
case law, or, alternatively, vacate the award in substantial parts in accordance with the arguments 
and record presented in connection with Issue 3 herein; and 
4. Award SBS its costs on appeal. 
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